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Reading the risk in a private trust for a family with assets in the CIS

A private trust for a family with assets in the CIS. The cross-border position and what it means. The Hong Kong angle in focus. Write to info@lockhartyip.com.

A private trust structured for a family whose wealth is rooted in the Commonwealth of Independent States (the CIS – the post-Soviet grouping of states including Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and their neighbours) is not a standard wealth-planning exercise. The assets sit in jurisdictions with their own succession regimes, currency controls and, in several cases, active or contingent enforcement risk. The trust is only as strong as the analysis of those pressure points – and, in our cross-border practice, the pressure points are multiplying.

This analysis maps the risk layers that a CIS-connected family trust now carries: the governing framework, the cross-border friction between civil-law succession rules and a common-law trust structure, the Hong Kong angle, and our current read on where the exposure sits. The argument runs in sequence.

What is commercially at stake when a CIS family structures a private trust?

The commercial question is not abstract. A principal who built a manufacturing or natural-resources business in Kazakhstan or a real-estate portfolio in Georgia now holds assets whose value can only be realised, passed on, or protected if the legal wrapper around them actually works across the relevant borders.

Three pressures define the stakes. First, succession: without a trust or an equivalent mechanism, assets in CIS jurisdictions typically pass under local mandatory succession law – often with forced shares, registration requirements and timelines that can take years and involve local probate courts. Second, asset protection: CIS-based assets are not immune to creditor claims, family disputes, or adverse political developments in the jurisdiction where the asset sits. Third, mobility: the principals themselves often hold multiple residences, children study abroad, and the family's centre of gravity is shifting. A succession plan drafted around a single jurisdiction is already obsolete for most families we advise.

The trust is the structure that is meant to resolve all three pressures at once. The risk is that it resolves none of them if the legal analysis at the point of establishment is incomplete.

What governs a private trust, and how does the governing law interact with CIS succession rules?

A private trust is governed by the law of the jurisdiction chosen as the trust's governing law – typically a common-law jurisdiction such as Hong Kong, the BVI, Jersey, or the Cayman Islands. In Hong Kong, the primary instrument is the Trustee Ordinance (Cap. 29), substantially reformed with effect from 1 December 2013. The 2013 reform removed the rule against perpetuities and excessive accumulations for Hong Kong trusts, strengthened the settlor's ability to reserve powers without invalidating the trust, and introduced a statutory firewall protecting Hong Kong-law trusts against foreign forced-heirship claims.

That firewall is the central tool in a CIS family's succession analysis. Most CIS jurisdictions operate civil-law succession regimes with mandatory forced-heirship rules – statutory shares that cannot be defeated by testamentary disposition. Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan each have their own codified succession rules. Under those domestic laws, a child, surviving spouse, or dependent parent may claim a statutory share of the estate regardless of what any will or trust instrument says.

The question a cross-border adviser must answer is: if a CIS court applies its mandatory succession law to assets held in a Hong Kong-law trust, can it reach those assets? The answer depends on three variables: where the assets sit physically or legally; whether the CIS court's judgment can be enforced against the trustee; and whether the trust structure has been properly constituted so that the legal ownership of the assets has genuinely passed to the trustee.

If the asset is a shareholding in a BVI company that owns a Kazakh plant, the chain of title runs: Kazakh plant → BVI co. → trust. A Kazakh forced-heirship claim would need to reach through two layers of foreign law to touch the underlying asset. That distance is the protection – but only if each layer is properly maintained. Where the chain breaks – typically at the BVI layer, through dividend flows going directly to the settlor, or through nominee arrangements that have not been kept current – the protection collapses.

How does Hong Kong fit into the structure, and why does it matter?

Hong Kong's role in a CIS family's wealth structure is not automatic. It is chosen, and the reasons for choosing it are worth examining carefully – because the choice carries obligations as well as advantages.

Hong Kong is a common-law jurisdiction, which makes its trust law directly compatible with offshore holding centres (BVI, Cayman) that typically sit above the operating assets in CIS-facing structures. The Trustee Ordinance's forced-heirship firewall is a statutory instrument, not a judicial doctrine – it provides a degree of predictability that purely court-developed protection does not. And Hong Kong's courts have a long track record of administering trust disputes, including cross-border recognition of trust structures originating in offshore jurisdictions.

At the same time, choosing Hong Kong as the governing law or the administration seat of a private trust creates its own obligations. The trustee must be real, not nominal – a corporate trustee with substance in Hong Kong, proper record-keeping, and genuine decision-making authority. The trust assets must be clearly held by the trustee, not by the settlor in all but name. And the trust deed must be properly executed and, where the structure involves a Hong Kong holding entity, registered in accordance with the Companies Ordinance (Cap. 622), including compliance with the Significant Controllers Register requirement in force since 1 March 2018.

For a CIS family, Hong Kong also sits at the intersection of the cross-border enforcement map. If a creditor obtains a judgment in a CIS jurisdiction against the settlor personally, the question of whether that judgment can be enforced against Hong Kong-held trust assets is a live one. The Mainland Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Reciprocal Enforcement) Ordinance (Cap. 645), in force since 29 January 2024, covers Mainland Chinese judgments – not CIS-state judgments. For CIS-originating judgments, enforcement in Hong Kong proceeds at common law, through an application to the Court of First Instance. A well-structured trust, with genuine separation of the trustee's assets from the settlor's personal estate, is the first line of defence at that point.

Where does the comparative read across Hong Kong and the CIS reveal the real risk?

The comparative analysis across Hong Kong's common-law trust regime and the civil-law succession systems of the CIS states reveals four risk concentrations. Understanding each requires honest assessment, not reassurance.

First: characterisation risk. Several CIS states do not recognise the trust as a legal institution in their domestic law. A trust is an Anglo-Saxon construct; it separates legal ownership from beneficial interest in a way that civil-law jurisdictions find conceptually foreign. A Russian or Uzbek court asked to assess whether assets "belong" to the settlor may simply apply its own property-law analysis and conclude that the settlor retains ownership – regardless of what the trust deed says. This is not a theoretical risk. It is the most common failure mode for CIS-connected trusts that our desk reviews.

Second: currency and capital controls. Several CIS jurisdictions maintain active or evolving foreign-exchange controls. The movement of value out of a CIS-based operating company to a BVI holding entity – as a dividend, an intercompany loan repayment, or a management fee – may require regulatory approval. Where those approvals are not obtained, the transaction may be invalid under local law, leaving the holding structure with assets it cannot lawfully receive. The trust sits at the top of a chain that has already broken.

Third: beneficial ownership disclosure. The direction of global regulation – including under the FATF (Financial Action Task Force) recommendations that most CIS states have adopted in some form – is towards greater transparency of beneficial ownership. Several CIS states have enacted or are developing beneficial ownership registers. A CIS principal who is named as beneficial owner in a domestic register, and who has also transferred assets to a trust, may face questions about the consistency of those positions. The structuring must be coherent across all the registers that apply.

Fourth: enforcement against the underlying asset. The hardest case is where the underlying asset – the plant, the real-estate holding, the operating company – is itself physically located in the CIS. No trust structure, however well designed at the holding-company level, immunises a Kazakhstan-registered asset from enforcement by a Kazakhstan court under Kazakhstan law. The trust protects the ownership chain above the asset; it does not remove the asset from local jurisdiction. Families who expect the trust to do more than it can are the ones most exposed when a CIS court acts.

The contextual bridge here is practical. The structure's effectiveness depends not on the quality of the trust deed alone, but on whether each layer – the CIS operating entity, the BVI or Cayman holding company, the Hong Kong trust or administration seat – has been properly maintained and is legally coherent with the others. A structure that was correct in 2019 may have drifted materially by now.

If you are reviewing an existing structure rather than establishing a new one, the analysis is equally important. Structures drift. The sequence and the current legal position of each layer need to be mapped before the risk can be read accurately. Write to us at info@lockhartyip.com to discuss how this analysis applies to your family's position.

What does the forced-heirship interaction actually look like in a CIS fact pattern?

Consider a family whose principal founded a logistics business in Kazakhstan in the 1990s. The business has grown; its assets are held through a chain of Kazakh subsidiaries ultimately owned by a BVI holding company. In 2018, the principal transferred the BVI shares to a Hong Kong-law discretionary trust, with a corporate trustee based in Hong Kong and a protector letter from a law firm in the BVI. The beneficiaries are the principal's spouse and three adult children from two relationships.

The forced-heirship question arises when the principal dies domiciled in Kazakhstan. Under Kazakh succession law, the children from both relationships have a statutory share of the estate. The question is whether the BVI holding company – held by the trustee, not by the principal – is part of the estate. The Kazakh court will apply its conflict-of-laws rules to determine governing law. Where the court characterises the transfer to the trust as a disguised gift or an ineffective disposition – because the principal continued to direct the business, because dividends flowed to his personal account, or because the trustee's minutes were prepared but never genuinely acted on – the protection fails.

This is not a hypothetical constructed for illustration. It is the pattern our desk sees most frequently in CIS-connected trust disputes. The issue is not the choice of governing law. It is the quality of the implementation and the consistency of conduct after establishment.

The Hong Kong Trustee Ordinance's firewall provision – which directs that the validity and effect of a Hong Kong-law trust shall not be affected by the forced-heirship rules of a foreign law – operates at the level of Hong Kong law. A Hong Kong court applying that provision will protect the trust. A Kazakh court applying Kazakh conflict-of-laws rules may not reach the same result. The protection is therefore strongest where the trust is administered, and the trustee's decisions are challenged, in Hong Kong – and weakest where the challenge proceeds directly in the CIS jurisdiction.

How does the residence and domicile picture compound the risk?

Succession risk and residence risk are not separate problems for a CIS family. They interact.

A principal who is resident and domiciled in Kazakhstan is subject to Kazakh succession law as to all movable assets wherever they are situated, and to Kazakh law as to immovable assets in Kazakhstan. If that principal acquires residence in the UAE or relocates to a third country, the domicile analysis changes – but it changes gradually, not immediately. A change of tax residence does not change domicile under common-law rules; domicile is a more durable concept, and a court will look at the genuine centre of the principal's life and intentions, not at the passport held or the tax filing made.

For the trust analysis, this means that the forced-heirship risk follows the settlor until domicile is genuinely changed, and that a structure built around an expected change of domicile that does not materialise may offer less protection than was assumed. We regularly advise on this sequencing question: the trust establishment should follow a domicile analysis, not precede it.

The residence picture also affects the tax position. Hong Kong has no capital gains tax, no inheritance tax, and no withholding tax on dividends. Profits tax is levied on a territorial basis, at 8.25% on the first HK$2,000,000 of assessable profits and 16.5% above that threshold for corporate entities. Where the trust holds Hong Kong-sourced income through a Hong Kong entity, the tax analysis is relevant. Where the trustee is a Hong Kong company administering assets held entirely offshore, the income character and the foreign-sourced income exemption regime interact – and, from fiscal years beginning on or after 1 January 2025, the Pillar Two minimum top-up tax applies to in-scope multinational enterprise groups with consolidated revenue of EUR 750 million or above.

For most private family trusts, the Pillar Two threshold will not be reached. But for a CIS family whose business has scaled to significant size, the question is worth asking before the structure is settled.

If an earlier structure was built around a residence or domicile position that has since changed – or that was never definitively established – the trust analysis needs to be revisited from the succession and tax angles simultaneously. Write to info@lockhartyip.com for a structured read of the current position.

What foreign counsel get wrong, and what the risk profile looks like now

The most common analytical error we see in CIS-connected trust structures assembled by counsel unfamiliar with the cross-border dimension is this: the trust is treated as a product to be installed, not a legal relationship to be maintained.

A trust deed drafted to a high standard, with a properly executed transfer of assets to the trustee, solves the documentation problem. It does not solve the conduct problem. The conduct problem is the daily reality of whether the trustee exercises genuine discretion, whether communications with the settlor are advisory rather than directive, and whether the trust administration records reflect actual decision-making. A CIS court – or a CIS-based creditor attacking the structure through common-law enforcement in Hong Kong – will look at conduct, not just at documents.

The second error is the assumption that offshore equals protected. A BVI company is a useful holding vehicle. But a BVI company that is dormant at the share-transfer and dividend level, while the operating assets are managed directly by the settlor through the Kazakh subsidiary, is not creating the legal distance that the structure requires. The BVI layer needs to be genuinely active – holding meetings, passing resolutions, issuing dividends through proper channels, maintaining its own economic-substance register.

The third error, specific to the CIS context, is underestimating how quickly the legal environment in CIS jurisdictions can change. Beneficial ownership rules, capital controls, and enforcement approaches have all shifted materially in several CIS states over the past five years. A structure that was compliant and effective at establishment requires periodic review against the current position in each CIS jurisdiction where an underlying asset sits.

Our current read on where the risk sits: the window for establishing a well-maintained, legally coherent trust structure is not permanently open. Beneficial ownership disclosure requirements are tightening across the CIS. Several jurisdictions are developing mechanisms to challenge asset transfers made in the period before the relevant rules came into force. And the geopolitical environment in parts of the CIS has made enforcement of foreign judgments against locally held assets both more difficult and more consequential than it was a decade ago.

The practical implication is that a family that has been considering restructuring – or reviewing an existing structure – faces a more constrained environment for each year that the decision is deferred. This is a genuine timing consideration, not a commercial pressure. The legal tools available to a family that acts now are more diverse than those available to a family that acts after a forced-heirship claim has been filed or an enforcement notice has been served.

Objection: "Our structure has worked fine for years. Why review it now?"

The myth that a trust structure established without incident is a structure without risk is the single most expensive misconception in private wealth practice. Structures do not break at establishment. They break when they are tested – at the death of the settlor, at a creditor's claim, at a family dispute, or at a regulatory inquiry.

A structure that has operated for five or ten years without a challenge has simply not been tested. The question is whether, if it were tested today, it would hold. The answer depends on whether the conduct since establishment has been consistent with the trust's terms, whether the holding layers have been properly maintained, and whether the legal environment in the CIS jurisdictions involved has shifted in a way that the original structure did not anticipate.

We have reviewed structures for CIS-connected families where the trust deed itself was well drafted but where six years of passive administration had created a factual record that would have supported a challenge to the trust's effectiveness. The cost of that review – and the remediation work that followed – was a fraction of the cost that a successful forced-heirship claim or creditor enforcement action would have imposed.

The cross-border element amplifies this. A Hong Kong-law trust with CIS underlying assets is subject to legal developments in at least three jurisdictions simultaneously: Hong Kong, the offshore holding jurisdiction, and each CIS state where an asset sits. Keeping the structure current requires monitoring all three.

For our desk, this is the core of what we do in the private wealth practice: not only establishing structures, but reading the risk in structures that already exist. The two exercises are different, and the second is often the more consequential. We invite you to review your position at our private wealth practice page or through our dedicated guidance on structuring a private trust for a multi-generational family.

Related practices

  • Private Wealth – succession planning, trust structuring and asset protection across borders
  • Tax Positions – territorial tax analysis, FSIE and Pillar Two for cross-border holding structures
  • Holding Structures – BVI, Cayman and Hong Kong holding entity design for international groups

Frequently asked questions

What does the route look like for a private trust for a family with assets in the CIS?
The route begins with a domicile and succession analysis – mapping which CIS states' forced-heirship rules apply and which assets they can reach. That analysis drives the choice of trust governing law, the design of the holding chain above the CIS operating assets, and the trustee's substance requirements. For a Hong Kong-law trust, the Trustee Ordinance's forced-heirship firewall is the primary protective instrument, but its effectiveness depends on the trust being properly constituted and consistently administered. The offshore holding layer – typically BVI or Cayman – must also be kept active and compliant with its own economic-substance requirements. The process is sequential: legal analysis, structure design, implementation, and then ongoing maintenance review.
How long does a private trust for a family with assets in the CIS usually take?
There is no single timeline. The legal analysis phase – covering succession law across each relevant CIS jurisdiction, governing-law selection, and holding-structure design – typically takes several weeks for a family with assets in multiple jurisdictions. Trust establishment in Hong Kong or an offshore centre can follow relatively quickly once the legal analysis is complete and the trustee is identified and engaged. The more time-sensitive element is often the asset transfer: moving interests in CIS operating entities to the holding chain may require local regulatory approvals, particularly where foreign-exchange controls apply, and those approvals have their own timelines that are determined by the relevant CIS jurisdiction.
How does the cross-border element affect a private trust for a family with assets in the CIS?
The cross-border element is the central variable. A Hong Kong-law trust with CIS underlying assets sits at the intersection of at least three legal systems: Hong Kong common law, the law of the offshore holding jurisdiction, and the domestic law of each CIS state where an asset is situated. A forced-heirship claim filed in a CIS court will be analysed under that court's own conflict-of-laws rules, which may not recognise the trust structure. The Hong Kong firewall provision protects the trust when the challenge proceeds in Hong Kong; it does not bind a CIS court. This is why the quality of the holding chain above the CIS asset – and the consistency of conduct after establishment – is as important as the choice of governing law. More detail on the cross-border dimension is available in our CIS private trust briefing.

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This publication is general information and does not constitute legal advice. For advice on your situation, contact info@lockhartyip.com.

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